Essay by Jon Paulien, pt. 2

"Armageddon and 'the War on Terror: Part II'"
John Paulien, Ph. D.,
Chairman, New Testament Department
Andrews University Theological Seminary

PART II:
The Strategy of Osama bin Laden

The goal of the Jihadists to restore Islam to a dominant place in the world today, using "terror" as a strategy, gives us some insight into the mindset of bin Laden when he gave the go-ahead for the attack of September 11, 2001. While the actions of the highjackers were gruesome and incomprehensible to Westerners, they are part of a strategic plan to change the balance of power in the world. The leaders of al Qaeda see the Islamic world being occupied by non-Islamic forces. To change the balance of power in the world al Qaeda must find a way to end the Aoccupation@ and re-unite Islam. Since the United States is the leading power in the world and the patron of many Islamic regimes, it is the power behind the "occupation and, therefore, the great enemy that motivates and controls the anti-Islamic agenda.

Defeating the United States directly is not a realistic option. But the kind of war bin Laden has unleashed burdens America with billions of dollars of expenses to fight "terrorism" at home and abroad. It distracts Americans with the constant fear of unsuspected attacks. It makes Americans feel as insecure as Europeans and Israelis have felt for decades. It makes isolationism look more attractive. If, in the process, the United States can be caused to withdraw from the Islamic world, other anti-Islamic powers such as Russia, India and Israel would be helpless to intervene. Corrupt and secular governments in the Muslim world would then have no base of outside support and would be overthrown by the Islamic masses.

So al Qaeda does not expect to destroy the United States directly, unless some doomsday weapon comes into its hands. The United States is too powerful and too distant to defeat. Rather, bin Laden's strategy has been to force the United States into a series of actions that destabilize the governments of those Middle Eastern countries that are dependant on Washington. If the United States could be made to look weak and vulnerable in the eyes of the Arab street, the governments of the Middle East would lose their credibility. If pressure from the United States then forces those governments to join the US in fighting Islamic militants or to remain silent in the face of Israeli aggression, popular uprisings could easily lead to their collapse. The ultimate goal would be the establishment of an Islamic superpower, a vast Islamic state stretching from Morocco to the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, governed by Islamic law.

Could a bin Laden achieve such goals? He clearly believed the United States does not have the stomach to suppress a mass, popular uprising. Unlike al Qaeda, Americans as a rule do their best not to hurt innocents. The same military that is virtually invincible in battle would have a difficult time handling an army of unarmed women and children. Although the United States has important interests in the Islamic world, they are not on a scale to justify the expense and casualties involved in a long-term occupation. To the degree that further jihadist acts in the US should occur, the American populace could easily sway toward an isolationist stance. If this isolationism should lead to withdrawal from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia and even the partial abandonment of Israel, the political world would have changed considerably in favor of the Islamic agenda.

So from bin Laden's perspective war in diplomatic, economic or military terms would only result in the further humiliation of Islam. But this new kind of war has altered the battlefield odds. Since the targets vastly outnumber the defenders, al Qaeda has designed a war strategy in which it has significant advantages. U.S. power is weakened in that defensive action must be widely dispersed. Suicidal fervor creates a low-tech battlefield in which superior technology is neutralized as a weapon.

The goal of the attacks on September 11, 2001 was not to defeat America. America was too powerful and too distant for that to happen. Osama bin Laden's goal was a very strange one from the Western perspective. He wanted to provoke America to attack the islamic world. More specifically he wanted to provoke America to attack Saudi Arabia.

Did you notice that 15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11 were Saudis? While the trained pilots were generally from other countries, the "beef" of the operation (the muscle-men who would take over the plane) were almost all from Saudi Arabia. Osama wanted it to appear that this was a Saudi attack on American. While he anticipated the attack on Afghanistan in 2001, he was sure that President Bush would not stop there. In order to stop al Qaeda he would have to control Saudi Arabia as well.

Why provoke an attack on Saudi Arabia? Because that is the holy land of Islam, the place where Allah met the prophet Muhammad, the place of pilgrimage, the land of Mecca and Medina. If any action could be calculated to inflame the passion of the islamic masses in the Middle East it would be a Western occupation of the holy places. Osama bin Laden wanted above all else to arouse the fervor of the people to rise up against the invaders and make life so miserable for them that they would be forced to withdraw, as the Soviets were forced to from Afghanistan. Yesterday, Afghanistan. Today, Saudi Arabia. Tomorrow? The world!

Does it sound like the demented scheme of a madman? To many it does. But when you consider what other options were available to stimulate a rebirth of Islamic power in the world, bin Laden's scheme doesn't sound so crazy. It was a shrewd calculation that the only way to get rid of corrupt and secular governments in the Middle East was to find a way to humiliate the sponsor of those governments, the United States. Once the sponsor proved powerless, these Arab governments would fall and the Islamic Empire would be reborn.

So let me summarize Osama bin Laden's dream scenario. His goal for September 11 was to do something so horrific that the United States would feel forced to invade the Middle East, preferably Saudi Arabia. Osama and his friends could then label it an attack on Islam itself. A guerilla war against the invaders would provoke the Americans to kill and wound many innocent bystanders. The "Arab street," the common, everyday man and woman in the Middle East would rise up in righteous anger against the occupiers. The military might of America would prove helpless against an uprising of "people power," unarmed men, women and children who would be willing to die for their faith.

In the face of such an enemy, America would have little choice but to pull back into bases and leave the streets in the hands of the insurgents, much as had occurred in Vietnam years before. Eventually, America would grow tired of the conflict. Media and congress would unite to force the president to withdraw and leave the Middle East to its own devices. In the wake of that superpower defeat, the masses in the Middle East would embrace Islam and Sharia law and the stage would be set for an islamic superpower that could extend from Morocco to Indonesia. That was Osama's dream and it will likely outlive him regardless of the outcome in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East.

The Strategy of George W. Bush

But that brings us to the obvious question, doesn't it? In the invasion of Iraq in 2003, wasn't President Bush doing exactly what Osama bin Laden expected and wanted? Wasn't he playing directly in the hands of the jihadists? Wasn't he placing young Americans in an impossible situation where they could be picked off in ones and twos? Wasn't the Iraq adventure doomed from the very start? Then why did he go there? Was it simply bad intelligence about weapons of mass destruction? Was it really all about the oil after all?

Here is where the deeper motivations behind the news have been poorly understood. The real geopolitical goals of the Iraq War have been hinted at in the media but rarely spoken out loud. The President himself has been careful never to tip his hand publically, even in the face of just criticism of the goals that were actually stated. Let's briefly go behind the scenes and unravel the deeper actions and motivations that don't always make the news.

What did the invasion of Iraq have to do with the war on terror? Why did Bush play bin Laden's game? What was he hoping to gain? The usual reasons make no sense. The invasion was not really about weapons of mass destruction. While it turns out that Saddam Hussein no longer had any weapons of mass destruction, everybody, including the Europeans, believed that he had. Yet in spite of that belief, most did not think that was a reason to invade.

The invasion was not really about Saddam Hussein. Sure, he was a rather unsavory character. Sure, he gassed the Kurds and massacred the Shiites. Sure his secret police was killing people right and left. But such events had been occurring for the last twenty-five years and had provoked no American invasion up to that point. Why invade now? The invasion was also not really about control of Middle Eastern oil. The oil was flowing fine before the war. The war has, in fact, driven up prices and created uncertainty. War hinders trade, it doesn't promote it. So all of the public reasons for the invasion make no real sense.

The real purpose of the invasion was the dismantling of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is not a national government. It is not a definable state with borders and institutions that can be destroyed. To dismantle al Qaeda means shutting off the flow of funds, most of which had been coming from Saudi Arabia. To deal with al Qaeda requires co-operation from every nation in which al Qaeda operates. It requires the free flow of intelligence information. It requires people to turn in relatives and friends who are part of the conspiracy. Since al Qaeda has always been rooted in the Arab context, it cannot be defeated without projecting power into the Middle East at some point. Osama bin Laden knew that and included that into his calculations of American behavior.

Let me illustrate the problem. It is reported that Osama bin Laden had at least 53 siblings from a variety of different mothers. Many of these were not sympathetic to the goals and methods of the jihadists. Many were living happily in the United States when September 11 occurred. Some, however, were sympathetic. The only way to accurately separate the "jihadists" from the "friends of democracy" in the bin Laden family itself is to be inside the family. In other words, the United States and allied governments need to be able to penetrate such families intimately and encourage brother to "rat" on brother and/or turn them in to the authorities. This is kind of thing is heavily destructive in any close-knit family and will be resisted in most circumstances.

The dilemma for the rulers of Saudi Arabia after September 11 was that they had to choose between pleasing the United States, who wanted to root out every potential jihadist in Saudi Arabia, and pleasing their own people, who didn't want such disruptive activities occurring in their own country and in their own families. Why would they choose to please the United States over their own people? After all, if they offended their own people, their own people would be motivated to overthrow them! So there was no way the Saudi rulers would fully co-operate with the United States in "the war on terror" unless they became more afraid of the United States than they were of their own people!

In a desperate attempt to distract the United States, the Saudi leadership began floating exciting proposals for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These proposals had no chance of being accepted by those who would be most affected by them, but offering the proposals set conditions for Saudi co-operation in the war on terror that the United States could never fulfill. What the United States heard in these proposals was that the Saudis had no intention of helping to destroy al Qaeda.

So how could the United States get at al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia? One option was to invade Saudi Arabia and do the job themselves. But that is exactly what bin Laden was hoping for and would likely have resulted in a mass uprising against the United States. The other option was to raise the threat of invasion to such a high level that the Saudi leadership would become more afraid of the United States than they were of their own people. To do that the United States had to find a way to effectively project power into the Middle East without inflaming the opposition of the Arab masses.

The United States had to find a way to convince the average Middle Eastern Arab that the United States was overwhelmingly powerful, even at the street level, and much to be feared, and that al Qaeda could put on a big show, but was essentially weak and could not protect its own. In other words, the United States had to create the perception that the jihadist project was doomed to failure and that casting one's lot with the United States was the more effective way to create positive change in the Middle East.

Enter Saddam Hussein. If there was one ruler in the Middle East who was widely despised in the Arab world and whose demise would cause few tears to be shed, it was Saddam Hussein, the secular, oppressive president of Iraq. President Bush gambled that taking out Saddam Hussein would not inflame the Arab street. There would be anger at the presence of foreign occupiers, but it would be a manageable anger. And if Saddam could be replaced by a government "of the people" there might even be some gratitude for American intervention.

The Invasion of Iraq

What did the invasion of Iraq have to do with "the war on terror?" At least three things. 1) It enabled America to project power into the very heart of the Middle East. 2) It exploited the fundamental fault line in the islamic world, the division between Sunni and Shiite. 3) It distracted the jihadists away from direct action against the United States. And there was a high likelihood that all three things would occur without the specter of mass uprisings across the Middle East. As with September 11, the real reasons for the invasion of Iraq were quite different than the reasons generally given in the news media. The "liberation" of Iraq was not the primary goal, it was the consequences of that liberation that would deeply impact the war on terror. Let me unpack each of these three reasons briefly, because they may not make sense on the surface.

1) Projecting American Power

In spite of many adventures in the islamic world, the United States had more military failures on its record than successes (the failed hostage rescue in 1980, Lebanon, Somalia, weak responses to earlier al Qaeda attacks). As impressive as the defeat of the Taliban was, it was still done with the help of others and left the country relatively unpacified. So the United States, in spite of its massive power, had the reputation of being a military and political weakling in the Middle East. It had to find a way to convince all players that this time it really meant business.

In order for a nation to truly project power, it cannot simply threaten from afar. It has to be able to put troops on the ground and threaten a nation's intimate interests directly. The invasion of Iraq put massive American power in the very heart of the Middle East. From the center of the Middle East, American power could threaten Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, all three reluctant players in the battle against al Qaeda but absolutely critical to success. The "elephant next door" would have to be taken into account in every word and action the neighboring nations took from then on. In back channel ways all three countries began to co-operate with the United States far beyond anything that would have happened otherwise. (The co-operation was usually covert, the public rhetoric [for the people's consumption] remained resistant).

This is why Germany, France and Russia were so opposed to the Iraq War. They too disliked Saddam and believed that he had weapons of mass destruction. They too believed that he could pose a threat to civilization. But the Middle East had been their back yard for two hundred years. The last thing they wanted was the American elephant in their back yard! So they resisted in public ways that seemed inexplicable, but it was all about power and who would wield it where. Everyone knew the real issue was projection of American power into the Middle East, and no one wanted to talk about it. That is why the whole debate over the Iraq War was so surreal.

2) The Differences Between Sunni and Shiite

The biggest barrier to Osama bin Laden's dream of an Islamic Empire is not American power, but a fundamental fault line in the Islamic world itself, the differences between the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam. This division between Sunni and Shiite makes little sense to the average Westerner. It basically has to do with which of Muhammad's original followers he intended to succeed him after his death. But this "fault line" is very real to Muslims and can raise even greater passions at times than the divide between Catholic and Protestant in the Christian world. The Sunni side of the debate is by far the stronger. In fact, the only two islamic countries in which Shiites are in the majority are Iraq and Iran.

Osama bin Laden is a Sunni, so the Shiites would naturally be opposed to his agenda. Saddam Hussein was also a Sunni (although there is little evidence he took his "faith" seriously), so he had seized power in Iraq against the will of the majority of his people (Shiites). A major war strategy of the United States has always been to divide and conquer. In 1941 it succeeded in separating Stalin from Hitler in order to win World War II. In 1974 President Nixon split the Communist world by befriending China at the expense of the Soviet Union. By invading Iraq the United States exploited Shiite opposition to Sunni ambitions, thus splitting the islamic world in two and securing Iran's back-channel co-operation in the war on terror. It also terrified the Saudis, who have always feared Iraq and Iran, in part because of a restive Shiite minority of their own.

3) Distracting Jihadists Away From the Homeland

By projecting American power into the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq presented the jihadists with a multitude of Western targets close to home. Attacking the American homeland from hideouts in southwestern Asia is a very difficult and expensive business. Sending a lone suicide bomber into a crowded restaurant next door is a lot less tricky and still makes a statement, especially if an American soldier or two is killed in the process. So an almost perverse goal of the allied invasion of Iraq was to take the war on terror to the enemy, thereby distracting him from the more difficult, yet more effective approach of threatening the American homeland. As President Bush said more than once, "I'd rather fight them over there than in our homes and communities here."

The invasion of Iraq was like a magnet, drawing jihadists and their sympathizers from all over the Middle East (and even Europe and Africa) to the "decisive battle." From both Osama bin Laden's viewpoint and that of the American government, the invasion of Iraq centered the war on terror in the Middle East instead of New York. That war would be won or lost on Iraqi soil, a location both sides preferred.

And from the American perspective, this shift occurred without the collateral result of a general uprising of the Arab street. There has been a significant insurgency in Iraq, but it has been largely limited to the Sunni sectors of Iraq. The vast majority of the Iraqi people have opposed the insurgency from the beginning. So in terms of Osama bin Laden's grand strategy, the Iraq Warstarted out as a victory for the American president, who gambled that the Arab street would tolerate the action and, on the whole, that turned out to be the case.

There were a number of things about Iraq that President Bush does not seem to have anticipated. He did not anticipate that Saddam Hussein would hold back his most-skilled troops in order to wage a long-term guerilla war in the streets of central and western Iraq. He did not anticipate that such a tactic would be successful enough to be a major drain on American energy. He did not anticipate that Iraq would become a drawing card for jihadist "volunteers" from all over the islamic world, and that they would become the formidable opponents they have been. He did not anticipate that democracy would be so challenging in an environment where everyone's first loyalty is to the local tribe, not the country as a whole. He did not anticipate that Sunnis would use bombings and suicide missions as negotiating tools to gain a stronger place at the democratic table. He did not anticipate that the average Iraqi would be more resentful of occupation than grateful for "liberation."

What Americans and the American government do not seem to understand is that any time you intervene in the sovereign affairs of another country, you upset the balance of that society. After the fall of the Soviet Union the first George Bush proclaimed a New World Order, in which politics would take a back seat to economic prosperity. Under the Bushes and Bill Clinton, America has seemed to think that Middle Eastern peoples wouldn't mind a little American intervention as long as their lives were freer and more prosperous.

But in fact American intervention always advantages one political group over another in the countries involved. In Iraq, the Shiites and Kurds benefitted more than the Sunnis from American intervention. In Afghanistan, the minorities benefitted more than the majority Pashtuns. In Kosovo, the majority Albanians benefitted more than the minority Serbs. Therefore, while well-intended, American intervention inevitably tends to destabilize the local situation, creating unforeseen problems.

So the invasion of Iraq did not prove to be the clean, overwhelming victory that President Bush and his advisors had hoped. While American troops in Iraq have certainly gotten the attention of the Saudis, the Syrians and the Iranians, they have been so occupied with the insurgency in Iraq they have not been the truly effective threat that was intended. The American media and the Congress have provided a constant negative drumbeat in the background, which has unintentionally encouraged the jihadist movement just when everything seemed to be lost.

On the other hand, there was no immediate repeat of September 11 on American soil. While there were a number of smaller bombings in places like Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Spain, the American homeland itself seemed increasingly secure. The power of al Qaeda to launch brilliant and complicated attacks anywhere in the world seems to have been seriously degraded. Al Qaeda's leadership seems to have become more obsessed with survival than with planning for future attacks.

The general perception at this time is that America's power has largely prevailed and that the jihadists still have plenty of bark, but that their "bite" is more akin to pinpricks than serious challenges to the world order. While the US and allied countries have taken serious casualties in Iraq, these casualties are nowhere near the level of Vietnam and the bombings are not a serious military threat to overthrow the occupation. In military terms the insurgency is an annoyance, but not a threat. The "Arab street" is annoyed at the occupation but a long way from rising up to provide a serious obstacle to it.

Projecting the Outcome

At this time the outcome of the war on terror is still in doubt. America remains mired in the Middle East. Various factions in Iraq are still more divided than united. The insurgency continues. Al Qaeda remains on the run, but is still alive in some fashion. Young men (and sometimes women) are still lining up in large numbers to blow themselves up for the cause. The world has become accustomed to intrusive security measures at airports and hotels. Everyone is more on edge than they used to be. The war on terror is far from over and its final outcome is hard to predict. But I would like to take a few lines to outline some indicators by which you can measure how the war is going in the future. Then I will close this chapter with some reflections on what all this has to do with the Bible's Battle of Armageddon.

Signs of Western Success

Which way are things heading in the war on terrror and how can you know? It is difficult to project, but the following signs would indicate that the war on terror is going the way President Bush had hoped.

1) If years go by without a significant jihadist attack on the American homeland. The longer the time without a significant attack, the more certain it becomes that al Qaeda and related organizations have been disrupted to the point of ineffectiveness. Small attacks in Europe and the Middle East are becoming almost business as usual, but they do not threaten the world political order to a significant degree. If Al Qaeda cannot order a repeat of September 11, its goals are in danger of non-fulfillment.

2) If the "Arab Street" remains generally quiet and accepting of the American presence in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden's strategy centered on provoking a massive popular reaction against American empire building all over the islamic world. That has clearly not happened up to the time of this writing and seems increasingly unlikely, barring some additional provocation beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (the recent spat over Danish cartoons and the Dubai port scandal are examples of such provocations). Ability to "manage the news" in the Middle East and to win hearts and minds on the street will probably be a crucial factor. As of this writing, al Qaeda has not yet found a way to incite the Arab street (although the recent bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra came close). As long as that continues, al Qaeda's ultimate goals remain dreams.

3) If Iraq is able to form a unity government in which all major sides play a role and minority rights are protected. Such a government would divide the Iraqi insurgency, bringing the secular insurgents to see politics rather than violence as the way to best benefit their constituency. The foreign jihadists sent in by al Qaeda would then be marginalized and exposed to capture. They would probably leave the country looking for easier pickings. This would be Bush's best-case scenario.

But developing a unity government will require a deft hand. The American challenge in Iraq is to find a way to please all the warring factions to the place where a central government can keep the peace and allow the American forces to go home or to be a strategic threat to al Qaeda sympathizers in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran. But this is a nearly impossible balancing act. There are four main political groups in Iraq. There are the Shiite religious parties, which want islamic law (their style). There are the Sunni religious parties, which want a different style of islamic law. There are the Kurds, who are Sunni in profession but are generally secular in orientation. And there are the Sunni and Shiite secularists, for whom a religious government is anathema.

In a Western setting it would seem that there is plenty of room for compromise and team-building. Why can't Sunni and Shiite religious parties get along? Shouldn't the Sunni Kurds and the Sunni Arabs be able to find common cause? Shouldn't the Kurds and the secular Arabs be able to work together? Yet a history of oppression and revenge killings leaves all sides taking the position of "My way or no way!" So the idea of an Iraqi unity government is nearly impossible to create and extremely challenging to maintain.

4) If some or all of the "big four" jihadist leaders (Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahri, Mullah Omar and Zarqawi) are killed or captured. These have great symbolic value (especially bin Laden and Zarqawi) to jihadists around the world. They are protected by networks of sympathizers in the places where they hide. To be able to capture them signals a breakdown in their sympathy and support network, a further indication that their organizations are being seriously degraded. It would lead to a perception of weakness in the jihadist movement, which could lead young people to choose other outlets for excitement besides resistance to the world order.

5) If democracy takes full root in the Middle East. This would mean that many Islamic fundamentalists have decided that the ballot box is a better way than the bomb to achieve political and religious goals in the islamic world. Islamic fundamentalism does not have to be at war with the West. Over time a more moderate form of islamist government may find that wary but peaceful co-existence is in the best interests of all sides in the conflict. Guerilla wars are not usually put down by military means. They tend to end when everyone decides that the fighting is counter-productive and goes back to negotiation and diplomacy as the best ways to safeguard people's various interests.

Signs of Jihadist Success

The followings signs, on the other hand, would be indications that the war on terror is going badly for America and its allies.
1) If al Qaeda and/or related organizations demonstrate that they still have the ability to stage a major attack like September 11 in America or in the heart of Europe. Or if there is an escalating level of attacks around the world, not just in the Middle East. More likely the relentless Western assault on all levels of the jihadist movement will cause the jihadists to go underground and take a longer-range view of the conflict. Jihadists and their sympathizers have long memories and a lot of patience. The war on terror is very likely to outlast the presidencies of George Bush and at least one or two of his successors.

Jihadists look for soft targets. These are becoming harder and harder to find in a world of obsessive security. But people cannot put up with obsessive security forever. At some point, people and their governments will relax their vigil and life will attempt to return to something a bit more "normal." At that point it will be seen whether the jihadists were able to maintain their focus in hiding and whether they will be able to rebuild the networks that seem to have been shattered since September 11.

My guess is that the war on terror will go on for decades (if time should last that long), but at a lower level of hostilities than was the case in 2006. Since the goal of the jihadists was political change in the islamic world, many jihadists may follow the lead of Sunnis in Iraq and give the political process a try. The jihadists may find that the rising level of democracy in the Middle East is an excellent way to achieve at least some of their political and religious goals.

2) If the "Arab street" becomes increasingly anti-American and anti-Western. If the average Muslim begins to think like the jihadists, it would be an ominous sign. Should women and children and ordinary Iraqis begin confronting American soldiers in large numbers (people power), you can know that the Vietnam syndrome is kicking in and the Western militaries will soon be withdrawing from the streets into bases. This will not result in a more stable situation, but the opposite.

The reality is that while the Americans were blind-sided by the insurgency in Iraq, the situation in the first years after the invasion was not nearly as serious in military terms as it sounded in the media. Things would have to get a lot worse than 2005 before the war on terror is in serious trouble. Internal memos among the jihadists about Iraq have been largely pessimistic. In terms of the big picture, the Iraq War, painful as it has been for the Americans, has not been a plus for the jihadist side.

An outside power, however, cannot shut down a guerilla war by itself. It needs significant allies in the local situation. Total loss of local support, for any reason, would be a sign that the American project in Iraq is doomed. It doesn't matter what causes the loss of support (whether prisoner abuse, the killing of women and children, offensive cartoons), what matters is the outcome. This is a key area that bears watching as time goes on.

3) If attempts to create a stable government in Iraq completely fail. Should Iraq break into several de-facto pieces, the Kurdish north, the Shiite south, the Sunni northwest, it is likely that civil war would break out. In that situation it would be very hard for the Americans to know who to fight and things could quickly get out of control. Turkey would feel threatened by an independent Kurdish state and would be tempted to intervene, which would put the Americans at odds with a close and vital ally.

Iran would feel threatened by the ascendency of either the jihadists or by a rebirth of Saddam's Baath Party loyalists and would likely intervene covertly in the south and middle of Iraq. The Syrians would take advantage of the instability to further destabilize the situation and get the heat off themselves. The Saudis would no longer feel the need to support the war on terror and jihadists everywhere could hide out in an unstable Middle East. All sides would be tempted to use oil as a hostage to their own ambitions, which would destabilize the world economy. So a destabilized Iraq and Middle East is not in the interests of a calm and peaceful civilization.

A particular element to keep an eye on is America's relationship with Iran. The Iranians have many agents in the Shiite south and a great deal of influence. If they wanted to, they could turn the south of Iraq into an insurgent war zone overnight. The Iraqi insurgency of 2003-2006 was almost entirely confined to Baghdad and areas to the north and west, the so-called Sunni Triangle. The insurgency affected no more than 20% of the country. The relative quiet of the Shiite south suggested a strong back-channel relationship was in place between the United States and Iran. Iran would keep the Shiites quiet in exchange for Shiite religious dominance of the resulting Iraqi democracy. But if the relationship between the US and Iran should break down over uranium enrichment, cartoons in Denmark, or the shape of the Iraqi government, things could disintegrate in a hurry.

My sense for now is that the scenario laid out in the first sign that things are going badly for the West is the most likely. The jihadists' political goals are likely to fail in the short run in the face of massive Western security measures. This will result in a lower level of jihadist activity but not its total disappearance. What the West calls terrorism to some degree will be an ongoing reality for the rest of our lives and perhaps the lives of our children, should time last that long. At some point, worldwide weariness could cause disillusionment with democracy and a rebirth of autocratic governments whose rise would be grounded on the need for peace and safety. Saddam Hussein was an evil man in many ways, but he did succeed in keeping a lid on Iraq's many warring factions. People may eventually feel a nostalgia for the "good old days," when strong leaders kept evil at bay and people were able to walk the streets in safety. Such a scenario is reminiscent of the kind of situation described in the Bible's Battle of Armageddon, which I hope to outline in a future book.

The War Against Al Qaeda and the Battle of Armageddon

Before I conclude, I believe it would be helpful to summarize the big picture of the Battle of Armageddon which I lay out in detail in the CD series offered at the end of this newsletter. As I understand the Battle of Armageddon passages in Revelation 16 and 17, the end of time will involve a great drive to unify the religious and political entities of this world in the wake of disturbing events described as frogs (Rev 16:13-14), intoxication (Rev 17:2), and natural disasters (Rev 16:1-9), among others. The result will be three great worldwide confederacies at the end of time.

1) The first of these will be a worldwide confederacy of secular and political power. This confederacy comes together when ten kingdoms (symbolized by the ten horns of the beast in Revelation 17:12-13) give their power to the beast, which represents worldwide political power in Revelation 17. Other symbols for this world-wide political unity are the Euphrates River (Rev 16:12), the kings of the whole inhabited world (Rev 16:14), the cities of the nations (Rev 16:19), the kings and inhabitants of the earth (Rev 17:2), the scarlet beast (Rev 17:3), the seven heads and the seven mountains or hills (Rev 17:9). This worldwide confederacy of secular, political, and military power is the driving force behind the world's End-time opposition to the Lamb and those who are with Him (Rev 17:14).

2) The second worldwide confederacy is a confederacy of religion, or better, religious institutions. It is also known in Revelation by many names; the dragon, beast and false prophet (Rev 16:13, 19), the great city (Rev 16:19; 17:18), the great prostitute (Rev 17:1), the woman Babylon (Rev 17:3-5), and the city Babylon (Rev 18). This End-time religious Babylon gathers the political powers into its service and dominates them for a short time (Rev 17:1-3, 18). The aim of Babylon is to destroy all opposition to its power, so its full attention is focused on the third confederacy.

3) The third worldwide confederacy in Revelation's narrative of the End-time I call the confederacy of the saints (Rev 13:7; 14:12). They too are known by many names in the Book of Revelation; the 144,000 (Rev 7:4-8; 14:1-5), the great multitude (Rev 7:9; 19:1), the remnant (Rev 11:13; 12:17), the kings of the east (Rev 16:12) and several more. These scattered saints are drawn out from every nation, tribe, language and people (Rev 14:6) and are the object of death threat and economic boycott (Rev 13:15-17).

The union of the first two confederacies (Rev 17:1-3, 18) seeks to destroy the confederacy of the saints, but falls apart under the overarching control of God (Rev 17:14-17). The Second Coming is the final act that puts an end to the enemy confederacies of the End-time (Rev 19:17-21).

Are the events since September 11 some sort of dress rehearsal for this scenario of the end of time? It certainly seems so to me. This is the first time in all of history when the mainstream political and religious bodies of the world are fundamentally united in a common cause against an international, underground movement that is united by a common faith. While such a situation existed at times in Europe in the Middle Ages, the islamic world was a powerful counter to the papal ambitions at that time. Today there is no nation or combination of nations that is able to fully counter the political and economic agenda of the United States. There is one single superpower and every other nation has to take that super power into account in every political and economic decision. This is the kind of picture portrayed in Revelation's end-time, as noted above.

Many nations, like France, Russia and China, would like to find ways to counter American power, but they have been unable to do so. France sought to use the European Union as a counterweight against American power at the time of the invasion of Iraq, but the majority of European nations did not go along. A combination of France, Russian, China and India would be significant, but competing self-interests seem likely to prevent such a counterweight from forming. While nationalism and ethnic centrism are stronger than ever, there is an underlying reality that we are closer to a single world system than ever before in history.

And this single world system is threatened, not by a nation or a combination of nations, but by a small, international collection of individuals, bound together by religious ideology, hiding in "the rocks and the mountains" and in chaotic cities like Baghdad, Kandahar, Jakarta and even London and Madrid! This sounds very much like the scenario laid out in the Battle of Armageddon. Worldwide religious and political unity against a scattered spiritual group from every nation, tribe, language and people!

Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that al Qaeda is the end-time remnant of Revelation! But the echoes of Revelation in the current world situation are remarkable and bear watching as we approach the end of the history. Not only that, the events of September 11 and its aftermath have led to an increase of spiritual interest, not only in New York but around the world. I find that Muslims are also more willing to talk to Christians and Christians are more willing to talk to Muslims. So the current situation is well-placed to develop into the kind of three-part scenario that Revelation portrays.

Both Revelation and The Great Controversy see troublesome world events as a precipitating factor in these end-time unities. I have just returned from Singapore and, trust me, terrorism is a major concern of all civilized countries around the world. In these troubled times it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which the current world situation rapidly moves toward the events portrayed in Revelation as part of the Battle of Armageddon.

Imagine (and I know this is hard) that one or more of the jihadist leaders becomes convicted by the claims of Jesus and announces a unilateral truce. He points out that Allah is all-powerful and does not need human intervention to accomplish His purpose for the world. It is true faith that will bring about the triumph of Islam, not bombs, hatred and anger. Imagine also that this new conviction becomes associated with the work of the Remnant people. Almost overnight, there would be a million new jihadist suspects in North America, and millions more around the world! Overnight the searchlights of "homeland security" in every nation could be turned on those who keep the commandments of God and have the faith of Jesus. Overnight, the situation portrayed in the book Great Controversy could be set in motion. God's faithful people could become the object of international scorn and calumny. Intelligence agencies and police forces around the world, goaded on by religious entities that feel threatened by this spiritual movement, move into action against the faithful people of God.

Sound far-fetched? Perhaps. But it is close enough to the scenario of Revelation to call for serious attention to the war on terror on the part of those who want to be ready for the final events. It will be chaotic events like those unleashed by the terrorists that will precipitate the great End-time confederacies predicted in Revelation. The result will be a worldwide unity of political and religion institutions in opposition to a worldwide confederacy of the saints. Such a situation has never occurred before, but is very close to the situation we find ourselves in today. Something to think about.

In a future book I plan to carefully examine those parts of the Book of Revelation which clearly describe the last days of earth's history and the events leading up to them. I will explore the meaning of the word "Armageddon" and how it is used in the context of Revelation 12-18. I will focus particularly on the context of Armageddon in chapters 16 and 17. After a careful study of the evidence in Revelation I plan to take a look at the scenario of The Great Controversy, which is based to a large degree on the same evidence. That future book will close with a return to the above scenario to explore where we stand in history today in light of the biblical text. Readers of this newsletter will be informed when the book comes out, probably in the summer of 2007. Those who don't want to wait that long can avail themselves of the CD offer included with this newsletter. The CD set on Revelation includes a careful analysis of the final battle of earth's history from Revelation chapters 12 through 18.

As we await the Battle of Armageddon, let's not forget that for many of us, the end of time will be a lot sooner than that. This is brought home by a rabbinical story:
A student once came to a rabbi and asked the question, "When should I repent?"
The rabbi replied, "Repent the day before you die."
"But when will I die?" The student retorted.
"No one knows," responded the rabbi, "Therefore the Scriptures say, 'Today, if you will hear his voice, harden not your hearts.'"


End Notes

1. For an analysis of the 1260 days/years of Bible prophecy, see my unpublished paper, "The 1260 Days in the Book of Revelation," presented to the Biblical Research Institute Committee of the General Conference on Sept. 29-30, 2003 at Loma Linda University. The paper is available upon request from the Biblical Research Institute and can also be obtained in electronic form on a CD (contact the New Testament Department at Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI 49104-1500).

2. For an excellent outline of the events surrounding the rise of Muhammad, see the sympathetic portrait by Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet (NY: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993).

3. The key to distribution of wealth (social justice) in the Arabian world before Muhammad was the ghazu or raid, in which a poorer tribe would seize a portion of a richer tribe's wealth by raiding its trade caravans. It was an early "Robin Hood" mentality. One historian has called the raiding party the "national sport" of Arabia in the 7th Century.

4. For a helpful overview of the Wahabi movement and the rise of Saudi Arabia see Clinton Bennett, Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the Issues and Debates (London: Continuum, 2005), 18, 53-56.

5. Adam Zagorin, "Finding the King's Fortune," Time, March 31, 2003, A20.

6.. The best analysis of these matters can be found in the work of George Friedman, the founder and chairman of Stratfor Corporation (Strategic Forecasting), sometimes called a "shadow CIA." George Friedman, America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies (NY: Doubleday, 2004).

7. I am well aware that "bin Laden" is not a family name in the way Western names function. It is a patronymic, meaning "son of Laden." But the father of Osama bin Laden was named Mohammed bin Laden, so the phrase is now being used in the Western way even in Saudi Arabia. I have therefore adopted this convention with the above qualification.

8. See George Friedman, America's Secret War, cited above.